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Covid-19 and South-South Trade & Investment







The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed the frailties of economic relations across different
aspects of the globalized network. From the national, through the sub-regional, to the
regional to the international levels, questions have arisen regarding the seemingly
interconnected, yet fractured socio-economic relationships in our modern societies. As such,
since Covid-19 assumed a pandemic status based on the World Health Organization’s
declaration on March 11, 2020, many scholars have revisited various questions that have
been brought to the fore as a consequence of the pandemic. One such prominent question is
whether Covid-19 will lead to a radical restructuring of economies for fairer and more
equitable redistribution of wealth and public goods. As Lorenzo Cotula and Brendan
Schwartz have noted in their recent piece on Covid-19 and global economic ordering, ‘the
ability of states to reshape their economic policy depends on development patterns, political
economies and their integration into the global economic system.’ Similarly, Jason Cotton,
Jan Yves Remy, and Alicia Nicolls’ contribution to this symposium makes the case for trade
vulnerability index, focusing on the Caribbean as a point of departure, One thing is clear,
countries in the global south, and especially least-developed countries, are among some of
the most vulnerable to the social, economic, and political risks associated with the current
pandemic.
In this post we shall focus on the trade and investment dimension of South-South relations
that have been affected by the pandemic. In doing so, we shall reveal the (often overlooked
or taken for granted) linkages with race in South-South relations. We identify the way(s) in
which the Covid-19 pandemic has made obvious the latent tensions, hostilities and structural
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inequalities that exist in South-South cooperation. We argue that three possible narratives
may emerge in a post-Covid 19 era for South-South trade and investment cooperation and
explore what each narrative might mean for the future of South-South relations.
This blog is the basis of a larger piece of ongoing research where we examine the scope and
contours of the three narratives for socio-economic (re)structuring of South-South
cooperation in greater detail.
Covid-19 will result in severe disruptions to global trade and it is currently estimated that the
pandemic will result in a fall of 13% to 32% of world trade in 2020. On the one hand,
international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have
been quick to respond to the pandemic, even if their responses have been more
controversial. In Africa, the African Export-Import Bank, among others, have announced
different packages aimed at mitigating the impact of Covid-19. On the other hand, and
notwithstanding that Covid-19 is first and foremost a health crisis, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has reinforced the need to ensure that “trade is part of the solution for
the recovery”. A tacit acknowledgement of the fact that trade may suffer in a post-COVID-19
situation as a result of protectionist measures countries is beyond doubt.
Already, countries have begun to notify export restrictions on medical supplies and
agricultural staples, like wheat and rice (albeit not yet on the scale of measures taken during
the 2007-8 global food crisis). States can adopt unilateral export restrictions provided they
satisfy the rules under the General Exceptions under GATT or under the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement. In other words, they are permissible provided that the
measures are necessary to protect public health.  Nanjira Annabel’s contribution to this
symposium elaborates on the three ways, export or import Covid-19 restrictions are
justifiable under the GATT framework. However, the IMF and WTO have urged governments
to ‘exercise caution’ as the result of implementing export restrictions en masse is likely to
‘prolong and exacerbate the health and economic crisis – with the most serious effects likely
on the poorer and more vulnerable countries.” Put differently, the effects of measures taken
in response to the pandemic may be catastrophic, especially for countries in the global
south.
South-South cooperation has evolved considerably over time, with technical cooperation
growing not only in terms of trade volumes and the value of financial assistance and
investment flows but also in terms of the geographic reach of countries working together.
South-South cooperation is notoriously difficult to measure but it is widely accepted that the
emerging economies, and especially China, have played a significant role in the investment
and growth of other developing countries. Furthermore, the global south are seen as critically
important for the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Despite the differences in the composition of the states, South-South cooperation as a form
of cooperation based on solidarity, self-reliance, equity, trust and reciprocity, is fraught with
structural inequalities and heterogeneity which we argue Covid-19 attenuates.
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The New International Economic Order (NIEO) & its Legacies
Economic cooperation between developing countries was first formally discussed at the now
infamous Bandung Conferencein 1955 and in 1964, the founding Secretary-General of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Raùl Prebisch, declared
South-South cooperation to be part of a “new trade policy for development”. In 1974, the
international community envisaged a New International Economic Order (NIEO) – a radical
restructuring of the economy focusing on issues such as trade, commodities, finance and
debt relief – to advance the “economic sovereignty” of postcolonial states in the global south.
It was the aim of the NIEO to rebalance a world that had become characterised by the
inequalities and injustices perpetuated over centuries by an international order structured in
accordance with patriarchal and colonial norms. The NIEO promised emancipation from a
history of subjugation for the global south and one means through which this could be
achieved was by technical cooperation between developing countries. It was the aim of the
NIEO to restructure the global economy but South-South cooperation has merely replicated
and reproduced North-South dynamics of power asymmetry, oppression and hegemony. The
legacies of the NIEO as a political project or unfailure as Nils Gilman suggests remain today.
Arguably, the growth of South-South cooperation is a legacy of the NIEO. These legacies
have taken many forms with the China-African relations, unarguably topping the chat in
recent time. However, less popular, but equally important dimension to the continued
legacies of the NIEO is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)/Africa relations which is
gaining momentum.
It has now been just over four decades since the concept of South-South cooperation was
formally set out in the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA). The BAPA+40 Conference
(2019) served as an opportunity to reflect on the significance of South-South cooperation
and celebrated the exchange of (traditional) knowledge and practices, ideas, innovation and
technology transfers and responses to crises that have come to typify this type of
cooperation and mark it out, in theory at least, from North-South cooperation. It is also
envisaged as a stepping-stone toward triangulation of relations between North-South-South
partners.
From 2000-2016, the economy of the global south quadrupled to $30.9 trillion in part,
because of the proliferation of regional trade agreements and the rise in technology-intensive
goods. Value chains in the global south are increasingly important for stimulating growth
among developing countries, with a 2019 International Trade Centre report showing that East
African businesses “capture 10% more value when they work in South-South chains instead
of North-South chains, increasing their bargaining power.” Global South value chains are,
therefore, integral to increasing the competitiveness and sustainability of businesses in
developing countries alongside or complementary to North-South value chains.
COVID-19 exposes the fragilities and vulnerabilities that exist between countries in the
global south
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However, the promising story of growth for global south economies is somewhat misleading
and the true potential for export diversification among global south countries remains
untapped. Similarly, that nature of the relationship between the cooperating states of the
global south is highly unequal, nested in South-South hierarchies which has led to a critique
that it merely reproduces the strategies of the global north. Growth in the share of global
output by countries in the global south is dominated by East Asia, and mainly China. While
there has been positive spill-over effects from China’s growth, with the demand for raw
materials increasing, developing countries with low productive capacity risk getting caught in
the development trap of low value-added production at the bottom of supply chains. In this
context, some, like David Mwambari, have argued that the COVID-19 pandemic is another
opportunity for African States to reimagine their economic independence and make a
transition from being mainly raw material exporting economy.
Furthermore, gaps in investor perceptions present a major practical challenge for the global
south and undermines the true potential of trade and investment in many developing
countries. China’s influence and presence across the global south, and its dominant position
vis-à-vis other global south countries, raises serious existential and practical questions about
the nature of South-South cooperation. Are the global south still cooperating within a system
based on solidarity, self-reliance, equality and trust? Or, is South-South cooperation
mimicking the patterns of hegemony and inequality that has come to characterise the nature
of many North-South relationships?
Covid-19 – and reactions to the pandemic – have exposed the fragilities and vulnerabilities
that exist between countries in the global south. Covid-19 has not revealed anything new
about South-South cooperation but it has intensified and exacerbated the embedded
inequalities and structural imbalances that have come to define the global economy and
South-South relations.
Formally, and at the international institutional level, the need for South-South cooperation is
greater now than ever before. For example, the UN Office for South-South Cooperation
(UNOSSC) has created a ‘Galaxy Mapping’ tool to identify how global south countries are
responding to the Covid-19 pandemic to “compare practices and learn from one another
through South-South exchanges”. Cuba, for example, has now sent approximately 1200
medical staff to twenty-two countries, including 200 healthcare professionals to South Africa,
to support the global south’s response to the pandemic.
China has projected itself as a “global benefactor” in the midst of the crisis, reportedly
sending medical supplies and staff to respond to the crisis around the globe and to countries
in the global south, including Africa. Yet, accusations and denials abound today regarding
charges of China’s complicit in the delay regarding the human to human contract of Covid-
19. Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s racial profiling of African immigrants has risen to
the fore. Human Rights Watch provided a detailed report of discrimination against African
immigrants living in Guangzhou who have been subjected to forced quarantines, evictions,
and refusal of services. The racialized nature of the relationship has become apparent in the
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wake of the Covid-19 outbreak with recent accounts of discrimination against Africans and
African Americans living in Guangzhou, China – including a ‘ban’ on black people entering
McDonald’s in the city. This has led to a diplomatic row erupting between China and African
countries. Unfortunately, as we have noted, China’s racism towards African migrants are not
new – they are a reflection of a larger attitude of the China towards Africans. The Covid-19
pandemic has only accentuated the racialized dimension of the trade, investment and labour
relations between Chinese and Africans.
But, the treatment of Africans seems at odds with Chinese ideas about solidarity and other
ethos of cooperation among South-South countries. In 2018, the value of China-Africa
bilateral trade was $185 billion while bilateral investment flows from China to Africa is
estimated to be $5.4 billion. In the same year, President Xi Jinping announced that China
would provide an investment package of $60 billion in financial assistance to African
countries. While financial support from China may seem attractive there are concerns that it
reinforces patterns of dependency and debt, making Sino-African relations mirror the
(neo)colonial relationships between global north and global south states.
However, the discourse of racially charged economic relations in South-South relations is not
limited to Sino-African relations. Discrimination and xenophobia have long been features of
South-South cooperation. The xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa,
religious discrimination against the residents of Assam in India and the Rohingya across
East Asia, and the “pigmentocracy” of Latin American economies are just a few examples of
how race, gender and class intersect with labour, trade, and investment in the global south.
Migrant workers in particular are more exposed to both the precarities of work (be it in the
formal or informal economy) and the risk of discrimination in society because of their
nationality, ethnicity or religion.
Three Emerging Narratives: Preliminary Reflections
How, then, is Covid-19 likely to impact on south-south cooperation? We identify three
narratives, or imaginaries, that could emerge as a result of the pandemic.
The first narrative is pessimistic in its outlook – the ‘worst case’ scenario of a post-Covid 19
world that will be characterised by deeper divisions and inequalities among and within
countries. On the one hand, this pessimistic assessment is the consequence of protectionist
strategies that (mostly) developed countries have adopted in their responses to Covid-19. In
its wake, it leaves the South-South countries in a worse position than they were pre-Covid
19. On the other hand, this possibility is enhanced by the inaction of the global south
countries to capitalize on this moment to reimagine how they might be better positioned in
the multilateral trading system. Further, the pessimistic narrative is enhanced because
protectionist measures triggered among south-south cooperating countries, due to Covid-19
will leave these countries in a ‘worse’ position post the pandemic. For example, in the African
context, the Covid-19 pandemic has slowed down the pace that the AfCFTA has generated
with the postponement of the implementation of the agreement. The implication of the
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postponement on the willingness of the cooperating states in Africa to continue to throw their
unconditional political weight behind the AfCFTA will emerge in the coming months.
However, one should not be surprised if emerging from the pandemic, there is a slower pace
in the willingness of many to push through with the AfCFTA.
The second narrative of South-South cooperation is more optimistic in terms of its outcomes.
It imagines a world where (some of) the global south countries instrumentalize this moment
to proffer concrete economic measures, responses and choices that will reshape the course
of economic development in the post-Covid-19 era. Our conceptualization of this optimistic
category is nuanced. Two examples of this possibility is the case which David Mwambari
makes so well that “the pandemic can be a catalyst for [economic] decolonisation in Africa”
and Bandar M.H. Hajjar who argues that coronavirus presents, yet, another opportunity for
Africa to do development differently.  In the same vein, an effective implementation of the
“African Union Commission, Afreximbank, Afrochampions and UNECA Joint Communique
on the need for a holistic and coordinated trade and investment response to the COVID-19
pandemic” that builds on the AfCFTA as “… the rallying initiative to drive the post Pandemic
economic recovery and the strengthening of African domestic, regional and continental value
and supply chains” is in this mode. Cautious optimism is the key word in this regard.
The third possibility is less determinative in nature and is, perhaps, the most likely of the
three narratives. In this scenario, we will see neither a fundamental reimagining of existing
South-South trade and investment cooperation with its embedded inequality, nor will a
deeper divide of the first imaginary materialise. Instead, and under this scenario, we will be
navigating murky terrain where the winners and losers of the post-Covid 19 era are difficult to
identify.
Whichever scenario prevails, there will be a need for robust and consistent regulatory
responses to the shifting landscape of south-south cooperation by domestic, regional and
international institutions. In this regard, Cotula and Schwartz’s argument in their compelling
piece, that we need to ‘reshape global spaces for dialogue, so marginalised voices are
heard’; as well as, Jason Cotton, Jan Yves Remy and Alicia Nicolls’ call for attention to the
lessons from the sufferings of the vulnerable among us post-Covid-19 resonates very well.
To the extent that measures taken to combat Covid-19 intersect with existing trade and
investment obligations for countries in the global south, and reveals the embedded tensions,
 we wonder whether regional governance can or should serve as a framework to create
equitable and just South-South cooperation, especially in times of crises. Regional and sub-
regional organisations, if operationalised effectively, have the capabilities to pool together the
financial, human, and intellectual resources that will be needed to identify interventions and
responses to measures that threaten the foundations of solidarity, self-reliance and equality
underpinning South-South relations. The effects of the pandemic are likely to be long-lasting
and innovation(s) in legal thinking and modes of governance are going to be critical to the
protection and advancement of cooperation among the global south.
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